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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Granted Green's Suppression Motion Because The 
Constitutional Standards Governing Arrests Under The Idaho State Constitution Are 
Coextensive With The Standards Of The Fourth Amendment 
A. Introduction 
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, Officers arrested Green on probable 
cause that she was violating Idaho state law by driving on an invalid license. (R., 
p.318.) This arrest, however, did not comply with Idaho Code§ 49-1407. (R., p.322; 
see also I.C. § 49-1407(1).) While acknowledging that the constitutional standards for 
arrest under the Fourth Amendment do not depend on state law, and offering no basis 
for interpreting the Idaho State Constitution differently, the district court determined that 
the arrest was unreasonable under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution 
because it did not comply with Idaho Code§ 49-1407. (R., pp.320-27.) 
The state appealed arguing that there is no basis for interpreting the Idaho State 
Constitution differently than the United States Constitution with respect to arrest 
standards. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) In response, Green argues that the violation of 
Idaho Code§ 49-1407 impacts her constitutional rights. (Respondent's brief, pp.8-18.) 
Green's argument fails. Green's arrest was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment and, like the district court, she has failed to show any reason for 
interpreting differently the arrest standards under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State 
Constitution. Her seizure was therefore constitutional and the district court's order 
suppressing evidence should be reversed. 
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8. Standard Of Review 
"Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law over which this Court exercises free review." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 
35, 40,232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (citation omitted). 
C. Arrests Conducted On The Basis Of Probable Cause Are Constitutional 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "warrantless arrests for crimes 
committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, 
and that while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state 
restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." Virginia v. Moore, 553 
U.S. 164, 176 (2008). Though our Court is "free to interpret our state constitution as 
more protective of the rights of Idaho citizens than the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the federal constitution," State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987, 842 
P.2d 660, 666 (1992) (citations omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court "will use federal 
rules and methodology unless clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of 
Idaho or its constitution indicates that Idaho's constitution provides greater protection 
than the analogous federal provision," CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Insurance Fund, 
154 Idaho 379, 384, 299 P.3d 186, 191 (2013). Because there are no circumstances 
unique to the state of Idaho, its constitution, or its long-standing jurisprudence, the 
standard for arrest under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution should be 
interpreted coextensively with the standard under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution: Probable cause that the defendant is violating the law. 
On appeal, Green asserts that, "[w]hile an unlawful arrest does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, long-standing jurisprudence indicates that Article I, § 17 is more 
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protective than the Fourth Amendment in this context." (Respondent's brief, p.8.) 
Green then offers zero examples of the "long-standing jurisprudence" where this Court 
has ever held that Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution provides greater 
protections than the Fourth Amendment in the context of arrest standards. The cases 
she does cite are of questionable relevance at best. 
Green cites State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978). In that case, the 
Idaho Supreme Court "expressly adopt[ed] the exigent circumstances exception to the 
'knock and announce' statutes." & at 588, 586 P.2d at 673. The Court further 
determined that "a case by case analysis must be made to determine if exigent 
circumstances exist as there can be no blanket exceptions." & at 590, 586 P.2d at 675 
(citations omitted). Finally the Court explained that, generally, exigent circumstances 
that would allow officers to dispense with the knock and announce requirement would 
be "(1) a reasonable belief that compliance with a 'knock and announce' statute would 
result in the destruction of evidence, or (2) a reasonable belief that compliance would 
place the officer in peril." & (citations omitted). 
Contrary to Green's assertions, the Court's holding in Rauch is irrelevant "in this 
context." First, Rauch, a case which considered exceptions to the knock and announce 
rule when serving search warrants, does not set forth the standards for what constitutes 
a constitutional arrest. Second, the Court's holding in Rauch is consistent with the 
precedent of the United States Supreme Court. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-
41 (1963) (approving the exigent circumstances exception to the knock and announce 
rule); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (rejecting a blanket exception to 
the knock and announce rule for drug crimes); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 
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(1995) (recognizing that the knock and announce requirement could give way "under 
circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where police officers have 
reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were 
given."). Green has failed to show that the Court's holding in Rauch interprets the Idaho 
State Constitution differently than the United States Constitution in regards to complying 
with the knock and announce rule, much less in regards to arrest standards. 
Green also cites State v. Matthews, 129 Idaho 865, 934 P.2d 931 (1997), which 
held that, where a warrant has not been signed by a judge and the defendant 
challenges the validity of that warrant, the search pursuant to that warrant must stop 
until a signature has been obtained. kl at 870, 934 P.2d at 936. Like Rauch, this case 
has no bearing on the standards for arrest. It is therefore irrelevant. 
Green cites Matthews for the proposition that "the search-warrant must conform 
strictly to the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issuance." kl at 
869, 934 P.2d at 935 (quotation omitted). But this language does not assist her 
argument even by analogy. Matthews does not stand for the proposition that statutory 
violations require suppression. The Court specifically rejected that interpretation in 
State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho 201, 91 P.3d 1105 (2004), explaining: 
The Matthews Court held invalid a search warrant that had not 
been signed. The majority did not base their opinion simply upon statutory 
requirements that the search warrant be signed, but upon a "substantive 
right in a citizen to refuse to permit a search pursuant to an unsigned 
warrant" that was "affirmed by Article XXI, Section 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution." The Matthews majority also cited Article I, § 17, as 
establishing a substantive right to a signed search warrant. Rather, in 
both cases the Court held that the error in question also impacted the 
constitutional rights of the defendant. 
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Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 204, 91 P.3d at 1108 (internal citations omitted). The state 
acknowledges that an officer's failure to comply with both constitutional and statutory 
provisions necessarily violates the constitution, because the failure to comply with the 
constitutional provisions is sufficient by itself to violate the constitution. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Matthews actually undermines Green's 
argument. According to that Court, the reason the statutes' requirement that warrants 
be signed to be valid was constitutionally significant was because they "predate[d] the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho" and so the rights they created were incorporated by 
Article XXI, Section 2. Matthews, 129 Idaho at 870, 934 P.2d at 936. Conversely, 
Idaho Code § 49-1407 does not "predate the Constitution of the State of Idaho," so even 
if it created some right, that right would not be constitutionally significant. 
Finally, Green cites to State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 45 P.3d 838 (2002), for her 
argument that statutory violations require suppression of evidence. Any such holding by 
the Court in Card has been abrogated by later Court decisions. See Bicknell, 140 Idaho 
at 203-04, 91 P.3d at 1107-08 (exclusionary rule not appropriate for procedural errors 
that do not violate the constitution); State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 647, 650, 152 P.3d 8, 11 
(2006) (exclusionary rule requires a constitutional violation and for there to be a 
constitutional violation the defect must call into question the Constitution's requirement 
of probable cause); see also State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 313 P.3d 732 (Ct. App. 
2013) ("Card appears to have been abrogated by later decisions."). As recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Moore, courts should not impose constitutional remedies for mere 
statutory violations. See Moore, 553 U.S. at 174. Rather, the legislature is able, and 
should be allowed, to determine the remedy for violations of its statutes. 
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Ultimately, Green argues that statutory violations which impact constitutional 
rights violate the constitution. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-18.) But Green fails to identify 
a single constitutional right that was violated by the officer's failure to comply with Idaho 
Code§ 49-1407. Under the United States Constitution, an officer may make an arrest 
based on probable cause that the law has been violated. Moore, 553 U.S. at 176. The 
question for this Court is whether Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution 
provides greater protections than the United States Constitution in regards to the 
standards for arrest. Green, like the district court below, has failed to show any basis 
for interpreting the Idaho State Constitution differently than the United States 
Constitution in this regard. 
The constitutional standard for arrest is probable cause that the defendant is 
violating the law. Officers had probable cause to believe that Green was violating the 
law by driving on an invalid license. Green's arrest was therefore constitutional and the 
district court erred by suppressing the evidence in this case. Its order should be 
reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting Green's suppression motion, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2014. 
(~R~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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